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Abstract 
Statistical modeling is often used to measure the strength of evidence for or against hypotheses 
on given data. We have previously proposed an information-dynamic framework in support of a 
properly calibrated measurement scale for statistical evidence, borrowing some mathematics 
from thermodynamics, and showing how an evidential analogue of the ideal gas equation of state 
could be used to measure evidence for a one-sided  binomial hypothesis comparison (“coin is fair” 
versus “coin is biased towards heads”). Here we take three important steps forward in 
generalizing the framework beyond this simple example. We (1) extend the scope of application 
to other forms of hypothesis comparison in the binomial setting; (2) show that doing so requires 
only the original ideal gas equation plus one simple extension, which has the form of the Van der 
Waals equation; (3) begin to develop the principles required to resolve a key constant, which 
enables us to calibrate the measurement scale across applications, and which we find to be 
related to the familiar statistical concept of degrees of freedom. This paper thus moves our 
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information-dynamic theory substantially closer to the goal of producing a practical, properly 
calibrated measure of statistical evidence for use in general applications. 
 
Keywords: Statistical evidence; information dynamics; thermodynamics 
 
Introduction  
Statistical modeling is used for a variety of purposes throughout the biological and social 
sciences, including hypothesis testing and parameter estimation among other things.  But there is 
also a distinct purpose to statistical inference, namely, measurement of the strength of evidence 
for or against hypotheses in view of data. This is arguably the predominant use of statistical 
modeling from the point of view of most practicing scientists, as manifested by their persistence 
in interpreting the p-value as if it were a measure of evidence despite multiple lines of argument 
against such a practice.  
In previous work, we have argued that for any measure of evidence to be reliably used for 
scientific purposes, it must be properly calibrated, so that one “degree” on the measurement 
scale always refers to the same amount of underlying evidence, within and across applications 
[1-3]. Towards this end, we proposed adapting some of the mathematics of thermodynamics as 
the basis for an absolute (context-independent) measurement scale for evidence [4]. The result 
was a new theory of information-dynamics, in which different types of information are 
conserved and interconverted under principles that resemble the 1st two laws of thermodynamics, 
with evidence emerging as a relationship among information types under certain kinds of 
transformations [5]. As we argued previously, this provides us both with a formal definition of 
statistical evidence and with an absolute scale for its measurement, much as thermodynamics 
itself did for Kelvin’s temperature T. But unless this new theory can produce something useful, it 
is purely speculative and not really a theory at all in the scientific sense, so much as an 
overgrown analogy.  
Until now, though, the theory has been too limited in scope to be of any practical use, for four 
reasons. (i) We have previously worked out a concrete application only for a simple coin-tossing 
model, and we speculated that extension to other statistical models (i.e., forms of the likelihood 
other than the binomial) might require derivation of a new underlying equation of state (EqS, that 
is, the formula for computing the evidence E; see below for details) for every distinct statistical 
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model. The principles for deriving these new equations remained, however, unclear. (The text 
will be simplified by the introduction of a number of abbreviations, of which “EqS” is the first. 
To assist the reader, abbreviations are summarized in Table 1.) (ii) The original EqS also  
 
Table 1 Summary of Abbreviations 
 
Abbreviation Full Name Description 
BBP 
Basic 
Behavior 
Pattern 
a characteristic of what we mean by 
“statistical evidence” that any measure of 
evidence must recapitulate 
d.f. Degrees of Freedom 
one of two constants in the EqS, used to 
calibrate E across different forms of HC 
e evidence evidence measured on an empirical (uncalibrated) scale 
E Evidence evidence measured on an absolute (context-independent) scale 
EqS Equation of State 
used to calculate the evidence from features 
of the likelihood ratio graph 
HC Hypothesis Contrast 
the forms of the hypotheses in the numerator 
and denominator of the LR (nested or non-
nested; composite or simple) 
LR Likelihood Ratio P(data | Hypothesis 1)/P(data | Hypothesis 2) 
S Evidential Entropy 
a particular form of Kullback-Leibler 
divergence, equal to the max log LR 
TrP Transition Point 
values of x/n at which evidence switches 
from supporting one hypothesis to supporting 
the other 
V Volume area (or more generally, volume) under the LR graph  
 
contained two constants, which we speculated might relate to calibrating evidence measurement 
across different statistical models, but again, the principles under which the constants could be 
found were unknown, rendering the issue of calibration across applications moot. (iii) 
Furthermore, the theory appeared to work correctly only in application to a one-sided hypothesis 
comparison (“coin is fair” versus “coin is biased towards heads”), failing even for the seemingly 
simple extension to a two-sided comparison (“coin is fair” versus “coin is biased in either 
direction”). (iv) Because we depended heavily on the arithmetic of thermodynamics in justifying 
some components of the theory, it was unclear how to move to general applications without 
relying upon additional equations to be borrowed from physics and applied in an ad hoc manner 
to the statistical problem. While this issue was ameliorated by the introduction of wholly 
information-based versions of the 1st and 2nd laws of thermodynamics [5], it remained a concern, 
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particularly in view of our inability to extend the theory beyond the one-sided binomial 
application.  
Thus we were faced with the question of whether the striking connection we had found 
between the mathematical description of the dynamics of ideal gases and the mathematics of our 
simple statistical system was really telling us something useful on the statistical side, or whether, 
by contrast, we had simply stumbled upon a kind of underlying one-sided binomial 
representation of the ideal gas model in physics — a model of use neither to physicists nor to 
statisticians. With the results presented in this paper, however, we take an important step forward 
in laying this concern to rest. We show below how the theory is readily generalized to support a 
wider range of statistical applications than had previously been considered, and we make strides 
in laying out the principles under which both the equations of state and the constants can be 
resolved.  In the process, we continue to see connections to the equations of thermodynamics. 
Specifically, we generalize the original theory to address the four limitations mentioned above, 
albeit still in the context of binomial models. We find that equations of state are governed by the 
different possible forms of hypothesis contrast (HC).  We are then able to extend the original 
results to other HCs, including the two-sided HC that thwarted our earlier attempts at 
generalization, by introducing a simple extension of the original EqS. We also show a connection 
between one of the constants and something closely related to the familiar statistical concept of 
degrees of freedom.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first (1) briefly review the key 
methodological principles and results from earlier work, and we illustrate the problem that arises 
when we move from one-sided to two-sided hypothesis comparisons. In (2) we group binomial 
HCs into two major Classes, non-nested and nested, and we show that the HCs in Class I can be 
handled via the original EqS, while a simple modification of this EqS suffices to handle the Class 
II HCs.  In (3) we consider resolution of a key constant across different hypothesis contrasts, and 
find that it is related to the statistical concept of degrees of freedom. In (4) we illustrate aspects 
of the behavior of the resulting evidence measure E within and across HCs. 
 
1. Review of previous results and the problem with two-sided hypothesis comparisons 
We begin with a high level definition of evidence as a relationship between data and hypotheses 
in the context of a statistical model. We then pose a measurement question: How do we ensure a 
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meaningfully calibrated mapping between (i) the object of measurement, i.e., the evidence or 
evidence strength, and (ii) the measurement value? Here the object of measurement cannot be 
directly observed, but must be inferred based on application of a law or principle that maps 
observable (computable) features of the data onto the evidence. This is known as a nomic 
measurement problem [6]. There are precedents for solutions to nomic measurement problems, 
particularly in physics; measurement of temperature is an example [6]. 
Our guiding methodological principle is that any measure of evidence must verifiably behave 
like the evidence, in situations in which such verification is possible. In order to establish basic 
behavior patterns (BBPs) expected of any evidence measure, we consider a simple model and a 
series of thought experiments, or appeals to intuition. This enables us to articulate basic 
operational characteristics of what we mean by “statistical evidence.” We then check any 
proposed measure of evidence to be sure that it exhibits the correct BBPs. As the theory is 
developed, we are also able to observe new patterns of behavior. These are considered iteratively 
to assess their reasonableness.  
These BBPs play a role here that is similar to the role played in some other treatments of 
evidence by axioms [7] or “conditions” [8].  However, in our methodology the BBPs themselves 
only support a measure of evidence e on an empirical, rather than absolute scale. Any proper 
empirical measure e must exhibit the BBPs. But as long as the only criterion is that e exhibits the 
BBPs, the units of e remain arbitrary and they are not necessarily comparable across applications. 
Thus the BBPs constitute a set of necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for a proper evidence 
measure. 
The primary set of thought experiments used to establish the current set of BBPs involves 
coin-tossing examples, for which our intuitions are clear and consensus is easy to achieve on key 
points. (Royall [9] also uses a simple binomial set-up as a canonical system for eliciting 
intuitions about evidence. However, his use of the binomial is quite different from ours. He 
appeals to intuition in order to calibrate strength of evidence across applications; we appeal to 
intuition to establish certain properties we expect evidence to exhibit. In our methodology, 
calibration is a separate process.) Consider a series of n independent coin tosses of which x land 
heads and n-x land tails. Let the probability that the coin lands heads be θ. And consider the two 
hypotheses H1: “coin is biased towards tails” (θ < ½), versus H2: “coin is fair” (θ = ½). We 
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articulate four BBPs up front. (We have described the thought experiments used to motivate the 
BBPs in detail elsewhere; see, e.g., [5]. Here we simply summarize the BBPs themselves.)  
(i) Change in evidence as a function of n for fixed x/n For any fixed value of x/n, the evidence 
increases as n increases. The evidence may favor H1 or H2, depending on x/n, but in either case, 
it increases with increasing n.  BBP(i) is illustrated in Figure 1(a). 
(ii) Change in evidence as a function of x/n for fixed n For any fixed n, as x/n increases from 0 
to ½ the evidence in favor of H1 decreases up to some value of x/n, after which it increases in 
favor of H2. We refer to the value of x/n at which the evidence switches from favoring H1 to 
favoring H2 as the transition point (TrP).  We also expect the value of x/n at which a TrP occurs 
to shift as a function of n, as increasingly smaller departures from x/n = 0.5 support H1 over H2. 
BBP(ii) is also illustrated in Figure 1(a). 
(iii) Change in x/n and n for fixed evidence In order to maintain constant evidence, as x/n 
increases from 0 to the TrP, n increases; as x/n continues to increase from the TrP to ½, n 
decreases.  These patterns follow from BBP(i) and BBP(ii).  BBP(iii) is illustrated in Fig 1(b).  
(iv) Rate of increase of evidence as a function of n for fixed x/n The same quantity of new data 
(n, x) has a smaller impact on the evidence the larger is the starting value of n, or equivalently, 
the stronger the evidence is before consideration of the new data.  E.g., 5 tosses all of which land 
tails increase the evidence for H1 by a greater amount if they are preceded by 2 tails in a row, 
compared to if they are preceded by 100 tails in a row.  BBP(iv) is illustrated in Fig 1(c). 
We can summarize by saying that the three quantities n, x, and evidence e, enter into an EqS, 
in which holding any one of the three constant while allowing a second to change necessitates a 
compensatory change in the third. Here e itself is simply defined as the third fundamental entity 
in the set.  At this point no particular measurement scale is assigned to e, and therefore numerical 
values are not assigned to e and e-axes are not labeled in the figures. Figure 1 is intended to 
illustrate behavior patterns only, rather than specific numerical results.  (In Figure 1 and 
subsequent Figures, n and x are treated as continuous rather than integer, in order to smooth the 
graphs particularly for small n.)  
Our overarching methodological principle is that any proposed measure of evidence must 
exhibit these basic patterns of behavior. While we are free to use any methods we like to 
discover or invent a statistical EqS, applying this principle to our simple set of BBPs severely  
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Figure 1 Basic Behavior Patterns for evidence e: (a) e as a function of x/n for different 
values of n, illustrating BBPs(i) and (ii) (dots mark the TrP, or minimum point, on each 
curve); (b) iso-e contours for different values of e, (higher contours represent larger values 
of e), illustrating BBP(iii); (c) e as a function of n for any fixed x/n, illustrating BBP(iv). 
Because e is on an empirical (relative) measurement scale, numerical values are not 
assigned to e and e-axes are not labeled in the figures.  
 
restricts the set of permissible EqSs. For example, it is easily shown that the p-value and –log[p-
value], the maximum likelihood ratio and its logarithm, and the Bayes factor all violate one or 
more of the BBPs; e.g., they all violate BBP(iv). Thus the equations used to calculate these 
quantities cannot serve as EqSs for measurement of evidence. Of course, in enumerating the 
BBPs thus far we have considered only single-parameter cases. Generalizations to multi-
parameter settings may entail additional considerations. 
We treat the likelihood ratio (LR) as fundamental. Originally [4] we considered only the 
special binomial form of LR, 𝐿𝑅 𝜃,𝜃 = 0.5;𝑛, 𝑥 =    !!(!!!)!!!!.! !  , with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 0.5 (a composite 
vs. simple HC with the simple hypothesis on the boundary of the parameter space). The EqS for 
this set-up was originally derived via the information-dynamic analogue of thermodynamic 
systems [4]. Here we focus only on the EqS itself and not its derivation. This EqS turned out to 
be a function of two aspects of the LR (and two constants; see below): (i) the logarithm of the 
maximum LR, which we treated as an entropy term (see Appendix 1) and denoted as S; and (ii) 
the area under the LR graph, denoted V, which is related to, though distinct from, the Bayes 
factor [10] and the Bayes ratio in statistical genetics [11]. Originally these equations were given 
as 
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 𝑆 = log !! ! !!!! !!!!! !           (1.1) 
and 
 𝑉 =    𝐿𝑅(!.!! 𝜃, 0.5;𝑛, 𝑥)  𝑑𝜃.       (1.2)   
In [4] we derived a simple EqS in the form 
 
 S = c1 log E + c2 log V        (1.3) 
 
for c1, c2 constants, where E represents evidence measured on an absolute, and not merely an 
empirical, scale [4].  Equation (1.3) is identical in form to the ideal gas EqS in physics, although 
we assign different (non-physical) meanings to each of the constituent terms. 
Because the focus of this paper is on application of the theory, we do not address the meaning 
of E in any detail here. But in brief, E is defined as the proportionality between (i) the change in 
a certain form of information with the influx of new data, and (ii) the entropy, such that the 
degree of E retains constant meaning across the measurement scale and, given the correct EqS, 
across applications.  See [5] for details.    
From (1.3) we have a simple calculation formula for E as 
 
 𝐸 = !"#!!!! ! !! .           (1.4) 
 
It is readily verified that using (1.4) yields an evidence measure E that exhibits the BBPs 
described above; in fact, Figure 1 was drawn by applying this equation.  In previous work we 
noted that the principles for determining the constants remained to be discovered, and we set the 
values somewhat arbitrarily to c2 = 1 and c1 = 1.5. We have found that c2 = 1 is required to 
maintain the BBPs. We continue to use this value throughout the remainder of this paper, but we 
have retained c2 in the equations as a reminder that it may become important in future extensions 
of the theory. We return to resolution of c1 in §3 below. 
Figure 2 illustrates the problem that we faced in attempting to use (1.4) for a two-sided 
hypothesis comparison. For given n and viewed as functions of x/n, Figure 1(a) and Figure 2(a)  
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Figure 2 The problem with using the original equation of state in application to the 
two-sided hypothesis contrast: (a) E as a function of x/n for different values of n, 
using the original EqS, illustrating the absence of a true TrP (dots indicate minimum 
value of E); (b) the expected pattern of behavior of behavior of e in the two-sided 
case, illustrating the correct TrP behavior, with symmetric TrPs on either side of 0.5, 
converging towards 0.5 as n increases. In (a), because we are using the EqS (1.4) to 
calculate the evidence, we label the y-axis E; however, because this is the wrong EqS 
here, numerical values of E are not labeled. 
 
 
 
exhibit similar shapes. In Figure 1(a) (one-sided comparison) the minimum value of E 
corresponds to the TrP, the x/n value at which the evidence begins (reading left to right) to favor 
θ2 = ½.  Figure 2(a) might at first appear to be a simple extrapolation, but in fact it must be 
fundamentally wrong. The minimum value should occur at the TrP, the x/n value at which the 
evidence begins to favor θ2 = ½.  But here the minimum point is occurring at the value x/n = ½, 
regardless of n. Thus this minimum point no longer has the interpretation of being a TrP, that is, 
a point at which the evidence starts to favor θ2 = ½. Indeed, there is no such thing as evidence in 
favor of θ2 = ½ here, since even as n increases the evidence remains at a minimum when the data 
fit perfectly with H2. Figure 2(b) illustrates the pattern (although not necessarily the actual 
numbers) we should obtain, which requires two TrPs, one on each side of θ2. In contrast to 
Figure 2(a), Figure 2(b) represents the correct reflection of the behavior in Figure 1(a) onto the 
region x/n > 0.5. In the following section we show how to adjust the EqS to produce the correct 
pattern as shown in Figure 2(b). 
 
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
x/n
E
(a)
 
 
n=50
n=25
n=10
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
x/n
e
(b)
 
 
n=50
n=25
n=10
arXiv	  June	  2015	  
	   10	  
2. Equations of state for non-nested and nested HCs 
We continue to consider the binomial model with the single parameter θ, and pairs of 
hypotheses specifying various ranges for θ. We restrict attention to HCs in the form 𝐻!:𝜃 ∈ Θ! 
versus 𝐻!:𝜃 ∈ Θ!, where Θ! ∪   Θ! = Ω, the set of all possible values of θ. For simplicity of 
notation, we use subscripts (1, 2) to designate the set of values of θ as stipulated under H1, H2 
respectively.  
Following a familiar statistical convention, we distinguish two major classes of HC, non-
nested (Class I) and nested (Class II). Within each of these classes we can further distinguish (a) 
composite versus simple HCs from (b) composite versus composite HCs. (Note that our 
requirement Θ! ∪   Θ! = Ω precludes simple versus simple HCs.) Figure 3 summarizes and 
illustrates the four resulting HC types.   
As shown in the figure, we further restrict attention to HCs in which θ = ½ plays a special 
role. Specifically, for Class I(a) (the original model [4]), we consider only 𝐻!:𝜃 ∈ [0,½) and 𝐻!:𝜃 = ½; for Class I(b), we consider only the case 𝐻!:𝜃 ∈ [0,½]  and 𝐻!:𝜃 ∈ (½, 1]; for  
Class II(a) we consider only the case 𝐻!:𝜃 ∈ [0, 1] and 𝐻!:𝜃 = ½; and for Class II(b) we 
consider only ranges θ2 ∈ [θ2l, θ2r] (where the subscript “l” stands for “left” and “r” for “right”) 
that are symmetric around the value ½. We have speculated from the start that the unconstrained 
maximum entropy state of a statistical system, which in the binomial case occurs when θ = ½, 
plays a special role in this theory. Indeed, in order to maintain the BBPs, calculations have 
shown that binomial HCs that are not “focused” in some sense on θ = ½ will require further 
corrections to the underlying EqS. We had also speculated previously that HCs in the form “A vs. 
not-A” play a special role. Here we extend the theory to include nested hypotheses. 
A little thought will show that Class I(b), like the original Class I(a), should have 1 TrP; while 
Class II(b), like Class II(a), should have 2. The absence of the second TrP was the major reason 
for feeling that our original EqS did not cover the two-sided case Class II(a), and it appears that  
Class II(b) will present a similar challenge. Thus we expect both Class I HCs to exhibit the 
pattern illustrated in Figure 2(a); and both Class II HCs to exhibit the pattern illustrated in Figure 
2(b). 
Before proceeding we need to generalize our original notation to allow for the additional 
forms of HC. Let 𝜃 = 𝑥/𝑛, the value of θ that maximizes the likelihood L(θ). Let 𝜃! =  the value 
of 𝜃! (i = 1, 2) that maximizes L(θ) within the range imposed by Hi.     
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Figure 3 Summary and illustration of four basic HCs considered in the text 
 
As noted previously, from the start we have viewed S, originally defined as the maximum log 
LR, as an entropy term; that is, in the original formalism [4] the maximum log LR occupied the 
place of the term for thermodynamic entropy in the ideal gas EqS. We now explicitly express S 
as a form of Kullback-Leibler divergence [12] (see Appendix 1 for details). The generalized 
definition of S (cf. equation (1.1)) becomes 
 
  𝑆 = 𝑃!(𝑥;  !!!! 𝜃) log !(  !;  !,!)! !!;  !,! .       (2.1) 
 
In the denominator of the LR i =2, except for Class I(b), for which i = 2 when x/n ∈   Θ! (i.e., 
when x/n  ≤ ½) and i = 1 when x/n ∈   Θ!  (x/n  > ½). In either case 𝜃! = ½.  
We similarly generalize the definition of V (cf. equation (1.2)) to 
 
  𝑉 = !(!;  !,!)!(!!;  !,!)   𝑑𝜃,         (2.2) 
          
where for the original one-sided HC, Class I(a), the integral	   is taken over [0, ½], and for the 
remaining HCs, the integral is taken over [0,1]. For a simple θi, 𝜃!= θi, therefore in application to 
the original one-sided HC, (2.1) and (2.2) maintain the original definitions for S and V as given 
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in (1.1) and (1.2). From here on, we utilize the generalized definitions of S and V in (2.1) and 
(2.2). 
The original EqS (1.4), which generates all of the correct behaviors for Class I(a), also 
generates all of the correct behaviors for Class I(b) (see §4 below).  Moreover, applying this EqS 
to Class II(b) fails in exactly the same way it does for Class II(a), that is, it fails to generate the 
second TrP.  It turns out that a simple adjustment to (1.4) generates the second TrP for the 
(symmetric) two-sided binomial HC Class II(a), “coin is fair” versus “coin is biased in either 
direction.”  In particular, we adjust our basic EqS by subtracting a term b from V.  This yields 
the new EqS  
 
 𝐸 =    !"#!!!! !! ! !! .               (2.3) 
 
The formula for calculating b is given in Appendix 2. Note that while the original EqS (1.4) was 
in the form of the thermodynamic equation for an ideal gas, (2.3) is in the form of the Van der 
Waals equation [13]. 
It is readily verified that (2.3) returns the correct behavior, with two TrPs, as illustrated in 
Figure 2(b) (indeed, Figure 2(b) was drawn using (2.3)), as well as exhibiting all other BBPs. 
Equation (2.3) also generates the correct behavior for Class II(b) (see §4). We might have 
guessed from the outset that the EqS for Class II(b) should be the same as the EqS for Class II(a), 
since, as the width of the interval [θ2r − θ2l] narrows to ½ ±  𝜀 , the two HCs become 
(approximately) the same, namely, θ ≠ ½ vs. θ = ½. Therefore for any given data (n, x), as ε 
shrinks to 0, they must yield the same value of E.  This strongly suggests that a single EqS 
should govern both types of HC, as indeed turns out to be the case.    
 
3. The constant c1 and degrees of freedom 
The central point of developing a properly calibrated evidence scale is to be able to 
meaningfully compare values of the evidence across applications. One obvious way in which we 
might need to adjust E across different HCs would be to allow for differences in “degrees of 
freedom” (d.f.). Here we are using d.f. in a generic sense, to signify the difference (or sum, see 
below) between the dimensionalities of the parameter spaces under the two hypotheses [14]. It 
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should not be surprising if some concept of d.f. enters into the calibration process for E given the 
familiar role of d.f. in frequentist statistical settings. At the same time, it should also not be 
surprising if the concept of d.f. enters into our equations differently than it does in other 
statistical settings, due to fundamental differences between our framework and frequentist 
methodology.  
For example, d.f. play a key role in the frequentists’ generalized LR 𝛸!.!.!  (nested) test. Under 
broad regularity conditions, familiar mathematics leads to setting the d.f. equal to the difference 
in the number of parameters being maximized over in the numerator and denominator, 
respectively, of the maximum log LR. The frequentist d.f. adjustment is required specifically to 
reflect the fact that the sampling distribution of the maximum LR under the null hypothesis shifts 
upwards the greater the d.f., and it serves to align Type I error behavior across hypothesis 
comparisons involving different amounts of maximization. But in our methodology the sampling 
distribution of the LR is irrelevant. Indeed, we have previously pledged allegiance to a version of 
the likelihood principle, which is ordinarily understood to preclude consideration of sampling 
distributions – the distributions of data that might have been but were in fact not observed – 
when evaluating evidence. (Moreover, the 𝛸!.!.!  itself represents asymptotic behavior of the 
maximum log LR. But we are expressly concerned with calibrating evidence measurement in 
finite samples.) Furthermore, d.f. as a parameter of this particular distribution are applicable only 
to nested HCs, whereas for us the objective of calibration across applications requires a concept 
of d.f. that allows a unified treatment of nested and non-nested HCs. 
Adherents of the likelihood principle, however, generally eschew any kind of d.f. “correction” 
to LRs as indicators of evidence strength even in the context of composite hypotheses (see, e.g., 
[7]). But the premise that a given value of the maximum LR corresponds to the same amount of 
evidence regardless of the amount of maximization being done strains credulity. Among other 
problems, this begs the question of overfitting, in which a bigger maximum LR can almost 
always be achieved by maximizing over additional parameters (up to a model involving one 
independent parameter for each data point), even in circumstances in which the estimated model 
can be shown to be getting further from the true model as the maximum LR increases. (See, e.g., 
the discussion of model fitting versus predictive accuracy in [15]. See also [16], for a coherent 
pure-likelihoodist resolution of this problem, which avoids “corrections” to the LR for d.f., but 
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which also precludes the possibility of meaningful comparisons of evidence strength across 
distinct HCs or distinct forms of the likelihood.)  
Prior to the new results in §2 above, we had been unable to derive the EqS for HCs other than 
the original one-sided binomial (with θ2 on a boundary), and therefore the idea of adjusting the 
calculation of E to reflect differences in d.f. across HCs was moot.  But the discovery that just 
two basic EqSs cover a wide range of HCs strongly suggests that any d.f. adjustment should be 
captured by some feature of the EqS as shown in (1.4) and (2.3). And, as these equations show,	  
c1 adjusts the magnitude of E for given S and V, which is on the face of it just what we need to 
do. 
It may seem odd to call c1 a constant and then to vary it. We note, however, that in the 
thermodynamic analogues of our equations (1.4) and (2.3), the position of our c1 is occupied by 
the physical constant cV, the thermal capacity of a gas at constant volume. This constant varies, 
e.g., between monatomic and diatomic gases, reflecting the fact that a fixed influx of heat will 
raise the temperatures of the two gas types by different amounts. Similarly, we can view c1 as a 
factor that recognizes that different HCs will convert the same amount of new information (or 
data) into different changes in E. This viewpoint is consonant with our underlying information-
dynamic theory [4, 5], which treats transformations of LR graphs in terms of Q (a kind of 
evidential information influx) and W (information “wasted” during the transformation, in the 
sense that it does not get converted into a change in E); the sense in which E maintains constant 
meaning across applications relates specifically to aspects of these transformations (see [4, 5] for 
details).  
The only remaining task then is to find the correct values of c1 for different HCs, as we 
describe in the following paragraph. Final validation of any specific numerical choices we make 
at this point regarding c1 will require returning to the original information-dynamic formalism. 
But we point out here that the choices we have made are far from ad hoc. The form of the EqS 
itself combined with constraints imposed by the BBPs place severe limitations on how values 
can be assigned to c1 while maintaining reasonable behavior for E within and across HCs. 
We have found that we must have c1 > 0.5 in order to maintain BBP(iv). Thus we begin, 
somewhat arbitrarily but in order to start from an integer value, from a baseline c1 = 1.0. In the 
case of nested hypotheses (Θ! ⊂ Θ!), we add to this baseline value the sum [θ1r – θ1l] +  [θ2r − 
θ2l] of the lengths of the intervals. Heuristically, we sum these lengths because it is possible for 
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x/n to be in either or both intervals simultaneously; thus speaking very loosely, c1 captures a kind 
of conjunction of the two intervals. In the case of non-nested hypotheses, for which x/n can be in 
Θ1 or Θ2 but not both, a disjunction of the intervals, we add to the baseline the difference [θ1r – 
θ1l] −  [θ2r − θ2l]. Using these rules we arrive at c1 = d.f. = 1.5, 1.0, 2.0 and 2 + [θ2r − θ2l], for 
Classes I(a), I(b), II(a) and II(b), respectively. Thus for Class II(b), 2 ≤ c1 ≤ 3. Table 2 shows the 
assigned values in the context of the EqS for each HC. 
 
Table 2 Final EqS for each of the four HCs.  
 
 Class I Non-Nested 
Class II 
Nested 
(a) Composite vs. 
Simple 𝐸 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝!𝑉 ! !.! 𝐸 =    𝑒𝑥𝑝!𝑉 − 𝑏 ! ! 
(b) Composite vs. 
Composite 𝐸 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝!𝑉  𝐸 =    𝑒𝑥𝑝!𝑉 − 𝑏 ! (!! !!!!!!! ) 
 
Note that as c1 increases, for given data, E decreases. Thus these values ensure some 
intuitively reasonable behavior in terms of the conventional role of d.f. adjustments. For instance, 
for given x/n, the two-sided Class II(a) HC will have lower E compared to the one-sided Class 
I(a) HC, which conforms to the frequentist pattern for one-sided versus two-sided comparisons.  
We consider the behavior of E in greater detail within and across HCs in §4 below. 
 
4. Behavior of E within and across HC classes  
Our overarching goal here is to quantify statistical evidence on a common, underlying scale 
across all four HCs. As noted above, (1.4) and (2.3) ensure the BBPs in application to each HC 
considered on its own, provided that we set c2 = 1 and c1 as shown in Table 2. In this section we 
highlight important additional characteristics of E beyond the original BBPs. Some of these 
characteristics conform to intuitions we had formed in advance, but others constitute newly 
discovered properties of E  – behaviors we did not anticipate, but which nevertheless seem to us 
to make sense once we observe them. 
We begin with Class II(b) on its own, as a function of the size [θ2r − θ2l] of the Θ! interval. 
Figure 4 illustrates the behavior of E for Class II(b). Several features of Figure 4 are worth 
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noting. Intuition tells us that for x/n ≈ 0 or x/n ≈ 1, as [θ2r − θ2l] increases, the strength of the 
evidence in favor of θ1 should decrease, to reflect the fact that even such extreme data represent 
a smaller and smaller deviation from compatibility with θ2. This pattern is seen in Figure 4(a), 
where E = 6.2, 5.4, 4.6 for [θ2r − θ2l] = 0.02, 0.20 and 0.40, respectively. For any given x/n ∈ Θ!, 
it also seems reasonable that the evidence, now in favor of θ2, should decrease as [θ2r − θ2l] 
increases, again as seen in Figure 4(a). This reflects the fact that Θ! ⊂ Θ!, so that evidence to 
differentiate the two hypotheses is smaller the more they overlap. At the same time, within this 
interval we would expect x/n ≈ ½ to yield the strongest evidence; however, given the overlap 
between Θ! and Θ!, we would not necessarily expect the evidence at x/n ≈ ½ to be substantially 
larger than the evidence at x/n closer to the Θ! boundary. Figure 4(b) illustrates this pattern for 
different values of n. Note that E is actually maximized at x/n = ½: e.g., for n = 50, at x/n = θ2l = 
0.4, E = 2.75, while at x/n = 0.5, E = 2.78.  It is also interesting to note that the TrPs move 
outward as [θ2r − θ2l] increases, as might be expected (Figure 4(a)); while for each fixed [θ2r − 
θ2l], the TrPs are moving inward as n increases (Figure 4 (b)), in all cases, converging towards 
the corresponding left (or right) boundary value of θ2. Thus in all regards, the adjustment of c1 
combined with the Class II EqS seems to yield sensible behavior for E for Class II(b). 
 
Figure 4 Behavior of E for Class II(b): (a) E as a function of x/n (n = 50) for different 
ranges for θ2; (b) E as a function of x/n for 0.4 ≤ θ2 ≤ 0.6 for different n. Note that this 
graph utilizes the correct EqS. Therefore the y-axis is now labeled as E and numerical 
values are shown.  
 
We can also assess the reasonableness of E for Class II(b) in comparison with Class II(a). As 
[θ2r − θ2l] à 0, c1 becomes the same for Class II(b) and Class II(a), by design. Thus the line in 
Figure 4(a) representing 0.49 ≤ θ2 ≤ 0.51 (c1 = 2.02) is virtually identical to what we would 
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obtain under Class II(a) (c1 = 2.00), and for the moment we treat it as a graph of Class II(a). We 
noted above that that for x/n ≈ 0 or x/n ≈ 1, evidence decreases as [θ2r − θ2l] increases. We can 
now see from Figure 4(a) that this also means that evidence is decreasing relative to what would 
be obtained under a Class II(a) HC.  Since under Class II(a) the HC always involves a 
comparison against θ = ½, it is reasonable that larger (nested) [θ2r − θ2l] would return smaller 
evidence at these x/n values relative to a comparison against the single value θ = ½.  For x/n = ½, 
we might have guessed that E in favor of θ2 should be also smaller for Class II(b) than for Class 
II(a), since the data are perfectly consistent with both θ1 and θ2 but Class II(a) has the more 
specific H2.  
Turning to comparisons across all four HCs, Figure 5 illustrates some additional important 
behaviors. Across the board, for given x/n, E is higher for the Class I HCs than it is for the Class  
 
Figure 5 Comparative behavior E as a function of x/n (n = 50) across all four HCs. For 
purposes of illustration, 0.4 ≤ θ2 ≤ 0.6 for Class II(b). TrPs are marked with circles (Class 
I(a), Class II(a)) or diamonds (Class I(b), Class II(b)). 
	  
II HCs.  This is the result of our assignments for c1, as discussed above, and it makes sense that 
nested hypotheses would be harder to distinguish compared to non-nested hypotheses for given n.  
Figure 5 also illustrates the relative placement of the TrPs across HCs, which is consistent with, 
and a generalization of, the BBPs involving the TrP considered in §1 in the context of a single 
HC. For instance, the TrPs for Class II(b) are further apart than for Class II(a), a pattern we 
might have anticipated. 
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Figure 6 reorganizes the representation shown in Figure 5 in terms of “iso-E” contours 
through the (n, x/n) space for the different HCs; that is, these graphs display the sets of (n, x/n) 
pairs corresponding to the same evidence E. For simplicity, the x-axis is restricted to x/n ≤ 0.5. 
(Recall that all HCs considered here are either restricted to x/n ≤ 0.5 or symmetric around x/n = 
0.5. Recall too that n and x are treated as continuous here.) For each E and each HC, the 
maximum value of the iso-E curve occurs at the TrP, with the segment to the left corresponding 
to evidence for θ1 and the segment to the right corresponding to evidence for θ2.  
One way to use these graphs is to find the sample size n corresponding to a particular value of 
E for given x/n.  For instance, to obtain E = 2 in favor of θ1, we would need n = 1.5, 1.1, 3.0 and 
3.6 heads in a row (x/n = 0), for Class I(a), Class I(b), Class II(a) and Class II(b), respectively. 
Apparently E = 2 is quite easy to achieve, in the sense that relatively few tosses will yield E = 2 
if they are all heads.  By contrast, to get E = 4 one would need 7.0, 3.0, 15.2 and 20.5 tosses, all 
heads, for the four HCs respectively; while E = 8 (not shown in Figure) would require 21.8, 7.0, 
67.3 and 106.6 heads, respectively. Another way to use the graphs is to see the “effect size” at 
which a given sample size n will return evidence E. As Figure 6 shows, whether the evidence  
favors θ1 (left of TrP) or θ2 (right of TrP), much larger samples are required to achieve a given E 
the closer x/n is to the TrP, or in other words, the less incompatible the data are with the non-
favored hypothesis. For instance, for Class II(a) and considering evidence for θ1, for n = 100, E = 
4 for x/n ≈ 0.07; but for n = 300, that same E = 4 is achieved for x/n ≈ 0.25, a much smaller 
deviation from ½. 
 
Figure 6 Iso-E profiles comparing four HCs, for (a) E = 2, (b) E = 4. For purposes of 
illustration, 0.4 ≤ θ2 ≤ 0.6 for Class II(b). 
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To our knowledge, ours is the only framework that generates a rigorous mathematical 
definition of what it means for evidence to be constant across different sets of data and different 
forms of HC. Note too that E is on a proper ratio scale [4, 17], so that 6(b) represents a doubling 
of the strength of evidence as shown in 6(a) (and E = 8 represents a doubling again relative to E 
= 4). This is a unique feature of E compared to all other proposed evidence measures of which 
we are aware. Figure 6 is a type of graph that can be meaningfully produced only once one has a 
properly calibrated measurement E in hand.  
 
Discussion 
With the results presented above, we have taken important steps forward towards generalizing 
our original information-dynamic theory in support of a properly calibrated measure E of 
statistical evidence. Three new results in particular move the theory forward. First, we have 
shown how to modify the original EqS (1.4) for one-sided HCs to obtain a new EqS (2.3) which 
handles two-sided HCs. More generally, we have shown that these two equations alone cover 
both non-nested and nested HCs, including a broad class of composite vs. simple or composite vs. 
composite comparisons. Second, while the original EqS had the same form as the ideal gas 
equation, the revised EqS needed to properly handle nested HCs has the same form as the 
thermodynamic Van der Waals equation. Third, we have discovered that the constant c1, which 
corresponds to cV in the physical versions of these equations, seems to function in the 
information-dynamic equations as a kind of d.f. adjustment, allowing us for the first time to 
rigorously compare evidence across HCs of differing dimensionality.   
To date we have focused on building this novel “plero”-dynamics (from the Greek word for 
information) methodology and understanding its relationship to thermo-dynamics. Because our 
motivation – proper measure-theoretic calibration of evidence – is distinct from the objectives of 
other schools of statistical thought, we have found it challenging to try to relate plerodynamics to 
components of standard mathematical statistical theory. But what emerges from the current 
results is a novel concept of evidence as a relationship between the maximum log LR and the 
area (or more generally, volume) under the LR, where the relationship is mediated by a quantity 
related to the Fisher information (for nested HCs, see Appendix 2), and also by something 
related to statistical degrees of freedom. This strongly suggests that we should be able to tie 
current results back to fundamental statistical theory. This will entail a detailed consideration of 
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the concept of degrees of freedom, as it appears in plerodynamics, with its corresponding role in 
familiar statistical theory, and/or with its role in physical theory.  
We had originally thought that every statistical model would require discovery of a separate 
EqS. But we now speculate that the EqS may depend only on the form of the HC, and not on the 
particular form of the likelihood. That is, our basic equations of state for the binomial model may 
extend to more complex models, based on general properties of likelihood ratios, at least under 
broad regularity conditions. Of course, so far the equations remain restricted to single-parameter 
models, and a somewhat restricted class of HCs (excluding “asymmetric” and non-partitioning 
HCs, as described above). We also have not considered extensions to continuous distributions. 
However, we follow Baskurt and Evans [18] in considering all applications of statistical 
inference as fundamentally about discrete, rather than continuous, distributions. This also raises 
the possibility of another way of relating plerodynamics back to thermodynamics, since in this 
case plerodynamics in its most general form could perhaps be represented solely in terms of the 
Boltzmann distribution.  
In this paper we have not focused on the “-dynamic” part of plerodynamics, but the 
underlying theory motivating the approach taken here is very closely aligned with the 
macroscopic description of thermodynamic systems in terms of conservation and inter-
conversion of heat and work.  As we have noted previously, there is, however, no direct mapping 
of the basic thermodynamic variables (volume, pressure, mechanical work, number of particles) 
onto corresponding statistical variables.  For example, the number of observations n on the 
statistical side does not function in our EqS as the analogue of the number of particles in physics; 
rather, the number of observations n appears to be part of the description of the statistical 
system’s information “energy,” rather than its size. (See [5] for discussion of this issue.)  
Therefore, but perhaps quite counter-intuitively, we do not expect to see a simple alignment of 
plerodynamics with statistical mechanical (microscopic) descriptions of physical systems, even 
in the event that we are able ultimately to consolidate the theory under the umbrella family of 
Boltzmann distributions.   
It remains an open question how deep the connection between plero-and thermo-dynamics 
really runs. Our discovery here that a simple revision to the ideal gas equation of state solves one 
of the difficulties we have faced until now – our inability to generalize from a one-side to a two-
sided hypothesis contrast – goes some distance towards vindicating our original co-opting of that 
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particular equation of state for statistical purposes. The further discovery that the revised 
equation is identical in form to the Van der Waals equation surely takes us some distance further.  
 
Appendix 1: Maximum log LR plays the role of entropy, not evidence 
We consider here the idea of the maximum log LR as an entropy term. We continue to restrict 
attention to the binomial likelihood in θ under the HCs considered in the main text. We note first 
that the maximum log LR is equivalent to a particular form of KL divergence (KLD), where  
 𝐾𝐿𝐷 𝑃! 𝑥;   𝜃! ,𝑃! 𝑥;   𝜃!       =    𝑃! 𝑥;   𝜃! log !! !;  !!!! !;  !!!!!!     
 =    𝑃! 𝑥;   𝜃! log ! !!;!,!! !!;!,!!!!!     
 = log !!!! 𝑥𝑃! 𝑥;   𝜃!!!!! + log !!!!!!!! 𝑛 − 𝑥 𝑃! 𝑥;   𝜃!!!!!    
 = 𝐸 𝑋 log !!!! +    𝑛 − 𝐸 𝑋 log !!!!!!!!    
 = 𝑛𝜃! log !!!! +    𝑛 − 𝑛𝜃! log !!!!!!!!             
 = 𝑛𝜃! log𝜃! +   𝑛 − 𝑛𝜃! log 1− 𝜃! −   𝑛𝜃! log𝜃! −   𝑛 − 𝑛𝜃! log 1− 𝜃! .   (A1.1) 
 
If we now evaluate the KLD at 𝜃! = 𝜃 = !! and  𝜃! = 𝜃!, as in the main text, we have what we 
call the observed KL divergence (“observed” because the expectation is taken with respect to a 
probability distribution based on the data), which is equal to the log of the maximum likelihood 
ratio (MLR): 
 
    𝐾𝐿𝐷!"# 𝑃! 𝑥;   𝜃 ,𝑃! 𝑥;   𝜃!      
     = 𝑥 log !! +   𝑛 − 𝑥 log 1− !! −   𝑥 log𝜃! −   𝑛 − 𝑥 log 1− 𝜃!  
 =   max! log !(!;  !,!)!(!!;  !,!) = log MLR.                         (A1.2) 
  
Note that Kullback [12] and others [19] treat Kullback-Leibler divergence as a key quantity in 
an entropy-based inferential framework (see also [5]), while the MLR or its logarithm is 
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sometimes interpreted as the statistical evidence for 𝜃  against some simple alternative value [9, 
20]. In our framework, the log MLR functions as the entropy term S (2.1). 
There are several reasons why the MLR (or its logarithm) cannot be an evidence measure. 
First, as noted in the main text, the MLR violates important BBPs. In particular, when more 
maximization is done in the numerator than in the denominator, MLR ≥ 1, and it cannot indicate 
evidence in favor of   𝜃!  or accumulate increasing evidence in favor of 𝜃!  as a function of 
increasing n, which violates elements of BBP(i)-(iii). Additionally, for fixed x/n, the MLR itself  
increases exponentially in n, while the log MLR increases linearly in n, both of which violate 
BBP(iv).  (Indeed, the simple vs. simple LR itself, which is sometimes used to define the 
evidence [9, 20, 21], violates BBP(iv).) Yet there is clearly a reason why the MLR seems to 
function as a reasonably good proxy for an evidence measure under many circumstances. 
We interpret the log MLR as the difference in information provided by the data for 𝜃  vs. 𝜃!.  
As a general rule, as information (in an informal sense) goes up, so too does evidence. But 
information and evidence also must be distinguished, in the sense that increasing the amount of 
information might reduce the evidence for bias, if the more we toss the coin the closer 𝜃 moves 
towards ½.  Apparently evidence requires us to take account of information in the sense of 
KLDOBS, or equivalently, in the form of the MLR, but not only information in this sense.  
 
Appendix 2: Calculation of b 
Here we describe the rationale for setting the constant b as it appears in the main text. The BBPs 
impose severe constraints on the set of available solutions for b, and it appears that there is little  
leeway in choosing a functional form for b that allows us to express E for both Class II(a) and 
Class II(b) through a single EqS while maintaining the BBPs.  
By experimentation (informed trial and error), we arrived at the following definition, which 
incorporates two rate constants: r1, which controls the curvature of b over Θ2; and r2, which 
controls the baseline value of b at the boundaries of this region, that is, at the points θ2l, θ2r. Let 
the value of b at these points be b(θ2l) = b(θ2r). We note up front that for given n, the minimum 
value of the Fisher information, Min FI(n) = −𝐸 !!!"! log 𝐿 𝜃 , occurs when θ = ½. Then we 
have 
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b =
r1V − r2
2π
Min FI(n)
; x n ∈Θ2
g b(θ2 j ),0⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ;otherwise
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
       (A2.1)   
 
where j = (l, r) and g is the linear function connecting the points b(θ2l) and 0 (on the left) or 
b(θ2r) and 1 (on the right).  
We set r1 = 2 – [θ2r − θ2l], so that the curvature of b depends on the width of the Θ2 interval. 
We found that we needed to constrain r2 such that ½ ≤ ( r1 – (½)r2) ≤ ¾. Thus we used r2 = 2r1 – 
½(2 + [θ2r − θ2l]). Figure 7 shows b and V for various Θ2 for n = 50.  
 
Figure 7 Relationship among V, b and V-b using (A2.1) to calculate b. Shown here are four Θ2 
intervals: (a) [0.49, 0.51], (b) [0.4, 0.6], (c) [0.3, 0.7], (d) [0.2, 0.8]. 
 
Acknowledgments This work was supported by a grant from the W.M. Keck Foundation. We 
thank Bill Stewart and Susan E. Hodge for helpful discussion, and we are indebted to Dr. Hodge 
for her careful reading of earlier drafts of this manuscript and for her many helpful comments, 
which led to substantial improvements in the paper.   
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
x/n
(a)
 
 
V
b
V−b
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
x/n
(b)
 
 
V
b
V−b
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
x/n
(c)
 
 
V
b
V−b
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
x/n
(d)
 
 
V
b
V−b
arXiv	  June	  2015	  
	   24	  
Author Contributions  Both authors contributed equally to this work. 
 
Conflict of Interests The authors declare no conflict of interest. 
 
References  
 
1. Vieland, V. J., Thermometers: something for statistical geneticists to think about. Hum 
Hered, 2006. 61(3): p. 144-56 PMID:  16770079. 
2. Vieland, V. J., Where's the Evidence? Human Heredity, 2011. 71(1): p. 59-66. 
3. Vieland, V. J.; Hodge, S. E., Measurement of Evidence and Evidence of Measurement 
(Invited Commentary). Stat App Genet and Molec Biol, 2011. 10(1): p. Article 35. 
4. Vieland V.J.; Das J.; Hodge S.E.; Seok S.-C., Measurement of statistical evidence on an 
absolute scale following thermodynamic principles. Theory Biosci, 2013(132): p. 181-194. 
5. Vieland, V. J., Evidence, temperature, and the laws of thermodynamics. Hum Hered, 2014. 
78(3-4): p. 153-63. 
6. Chang H., Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress. 2004, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
7. Zhang Z. A law of likelihood for composite hypotheses. arXiv, 2009. arxiv:0901.0463v1. 
8. Lele, S. R., Evidence Functions and the Optimality of the Law of Likelihood, in The Nature 
of Scientific Evidence: Statistical, Philosophical, and Empirical Considerations, 
M.L.T.a.S.R. Lele, Editor. 2004, University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 
9. Royall R., Statistical Evidence: A likelihood paradigm. 1997, London: Chapman & Hall. 
10. Kass R.E.; Raftery A.E., Bayes Factors. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 
1995. 90(430): p. 773-795. 
11. Vieland V. J.; Huang Y.; Seok S-C.; Burian J.; Catalyurek U.; O'Connell J.; Segre A.; 
Valentine-Cooper W., KELVIN: a software package for rigorous measurement of statistical 
evidence in human genetics. Human Heredity, 2011. 72(4): p. 276-88. 
12. Kullback S., Information Theory and Statistics. 1997, New York: Dover. 
13. Fermi E., Thermodynamics. 1956 (orig. 1936), New York: Dover Publications. 
14. Good, I. J., What are degrees of freedom? Amer Statistician, 1973. 27(5): p. 227-228. 
15. Sober, E., Evidence and Evolution: The logic behind the science. 2008: Cambridge UP. 
16. Strug, L. J.; Hodge, S. E., An alternative foundation for the planning and evaluation of 
linkage analysis I. Decoupling 'error probabilities' from 'measures of evidence'. Human 
Heredity, 2006. 61(3): p. 166-188. 
17. Krantz, D. H.; Luce, R. D.; P., S.; Tversky, A., Foundations of Measurement Vol. 1. 1971, 
Mineola, NY: Dover (2007). 
18. Baskurt, Z.; Evans M, Hypothesis assessment and inequalities for Bayes factors and relative 
belief ratios. Bayesian Analysis, 2013. 8(3): p. 569-590. 
19. Soofi, E. S., Principal Information Theoretic Approaches. J Amer Statist Assoc, 2000. 
95(452): p. 1349-1353. 
20. Hacking, I., Logic of Statistical Inference. 1965, London: Cambridge University Press. 
21. Edwards, A., Likelihood. 1992, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
